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Abstract This article uses Marc Lewis’ work as a
springboard to discuss the socio-political context of
the brain disease model of addiction (BDMA). The
claim that promotion of the BDMA is the only way
the general public can be persuaded to withhold
blame and punishment from addicts is critically ex-
amined. After a discussion of public understandings
of the disease concept of addiction, it is pointed out
that it is possible to develop a scientific account of
addiction which is neither a disease nor a moral
model but which the public could understand. Evi-
dence is reviewed to suggest that public acceptance
of the disease concept is largely lip-service and that
the claim the BDMA removes stigma among the
public and professionals is unsupported by evidence.
Further, there is good evidence that biogenetic ex-
planations of mental/behavioural disorders in gener-
al have been counterproductive in the attempt to ally
stigma. A model of addiction as a disorder of choice
may attract special problems in public-facing com-
munications and risks being misunderstood. However,
ways of presenting this model to the public are sug-
gested that may avoid such risks. Lastly, the claim that
the BDMA is the only way of ensuring access to treat-
ment and of maintaining research funding for addiction
is disputed and a way in which these benefits can be
retained under a disorder-of-choice model proposed.
The article concludes by enthusiastically endorsing
Lewis’ call for a third stage in the governing image of
addiction.
Keywords Brain diseasemodel of addiction .Moral
model . Developmental-learningmodel . Addiction as a
disorder of choice . Public-facing communications .
Stigma
Introduction
Marc Lewis is unusual, perhaps unique,1 in being a
neuroscientist interested in addiction who believes that
it is not best seen as a brain disease [3–5]. He has done a
great service to those of us who share his view that the
brain disease model of addiction (BDMA) is mistaken
but who lack the expertise to criticise it on neurobiolog-
ical grounds. But despite this debt of gratitude, I will not
be concerned in this article with Lewis’ analysis of
where the BDMA goes theoretically wrong or with the
internal inadequacies of any other disease account of
addiction (but see [6–8]). Rather, I want to use Lewis’
work as a springboard to discuss the socio-political
context of the BDMA and its possible alternatives and,
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1 Another neuroscientist who rejects the brain disease model of
addiction is Carl Hart [2].
Parts of this article are adapted from text in Heather, Nick. 2017.
Overview of addiction as a disorder of choice and future
prospects. In Addiction and choice: rethinking the relationship,
eds. Nick Heather and Gabriel Segal, 463–482. Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press [1].
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specifically, a spurious claim often made by BDMA
supporters.
The claim is that the promotion of the BDMA is the
only way in which members of the general public, and
presumably policy-makers, opinions-formers, etc. too,
can be persuaded to withhold blame and punishment
from addicts for their troublesome behaviour and the
only way to combat the stigma society attaches to them.
Put another way, the claim is that a rejection of the
BDMA is equivalent to believing and promoting the
idea that addiction signifies a moral failing on the part
of addicts. This follows from the assumption that addic-
tion is either a brain disease or a moral failing, with no
other understanding of addiction possible.
Many examples of this claim could be provided but I
will focus here on two – from the early days of the
attempted popularisation of the BDMA and from the
latest defence of the model by its most prominent sup-
porters. In what may be termed the BDMA manifesto,
Alan Leshner, then Director of the National Institute on
Drug Abuse (NIDA) in the USA, wrote [9] as follows:
BOne major barrier (to closing the gap between
scientific and public understanding) is the tremen-
dous stigma attached to being a drug user or, worse,
an addict. The most beneficent public view of drug
addicts is as victims of their societal situation. How-
ever, themore common view is that drug addicts are
weak or bad people, unwilling to lead moral lives
and to control their behavior and gratifications. To
the contrary, addiction is actually a chronic, relap-
sing illness, characterized by compulsive drug seek-
ing and use…. The gulf in implications between the
‘bad person’ view and the ‘chronic illness sufferer’
view is tremendous. As just one example, there are
many people who believe that addicted individuals
do not even deserve treatment. This stigma, and the
underlying moralistic tone, is a significant overlay
on all decisions that relate to drug use and drug
users^ (p.45, parentheses added).
The implication of this passage is that the only alter-
native to seeing addicts as weak or bad people, and thus
the only way to avoid stigmatising them, is to view them
as suffering from a chronic, relapsing (brain) illness.
In a recent article aimed at defending the BDMA
against critics, Nora Volkow, the current Director of
NIDA, together with two prominent supporters of the
BDMA [10] insists that BAfter centuries of efforts to
reduce addiction and its related costs by punishing
addictive behaviors failed to produce adequate results,
recent basic and clinical research has provided clear
evidence that addiction might be better considered and
treated as an acquired disease of the brain^ (p.363). The
implication here is that it is only the discovery that
addiction is a brain disease that has put an end to the
punishment of addicts. They go on:
BThe concept of addiction as a disease of the brain
challenges deeply ingrained values about self-
determination and personal responsibility that
frame drug use as a voluntary, hedonistic act. In
this view, addiction results from the repetition of
voluntary behaviors. How, then, can it be the
result of a disease process? The concept of addic-
tion as a brain disease has even more disconcert-
ing implications for public attitudes and policies
toward the addict. This concept of addiction ap-
pears to some to excuse personal irresponsibility
and criminal acts instead of punishing harmful and
often illegal behaviors^ (p.364).
The influence of the article by Volkow and col-
leagues, published in a prestigious medical journal,
quickly found its way into the blogosphere. The jour-
nalist Tori Utley, writing for Forbes, was convinced by
the article that Baddiction should be viewed as an acquired
disease of the brain, based on research that continues to
give neurobiological evidence of addiction as a disease,
not a moral failing^ [11]. Dr. Michael Brant-Zawadzki,
executive medical director of the Hoag Neurosciences
Institute in California, went further in asserting that label-
ling addiction as a choice or habit, instead of Bwhat it truly
is^, a chronic treatable brain disease, is intellectually
dishonest [12].
Enough has been said to establish that the promotion
of the BDMA is typically accompanied by the rider that
its only alternative is a ‘moral’ view of addiction.
What Does the Public Understand by the Disease
of Addiction?
There has been too little research on this important
question but some answers to it can be advanced.
It is clear that the meaning of the term in the
ordinary language has changed significantly over
the centuries [13] and that more recent usage has
expanded from psychoactive substances to a wide
range of substance-related and non-substance activities,
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to the point arguably where ‘addiction’ signifies little
more than something a person spends a great deal of
time doing [14].
In terms of attributed causality, Robin Room [15] has
suggested that the addiction concept offers modern so-
ciety Ba secular equivalent for possession as an expla-
nation of how a good person can behave badly, and as an
inner demon over which a hero can triumph^ (p. 221). If
so, it should be noted that, like the concept of demonic
possession, this attempted explanation is circular: Why
do people behave repeatedly in ways that are bad for
them? Because of addiction;What is addiction? Behaving
repeatedly in ways that are bad for you.
Whatever its explanatory function as a cultural con-
cept, however, it seems true that, in relation to substance
use if nothing else, addiction can serve the purpose in
society that supporters of the BDMA claim for it -
providing a way for members of the general public and
others to accept, superficially at least, that addicts should
not be punished for their troublesome behaviour but
should instead receive compassion and care. Indeed,
the disease concept has been promoted from about the
end of World War 2 as a mark of liberal and enlightened
opinion. In contrast to the old-fashioned and reactionary
view that addicts are, in Leshner’s words, weak or bad
people, it is now known that addicts ‘can’t help’ behav-
ing the way they do because they are compelled to
behave that way by their disease of addiction. This
exculpatory logic applies, of course, to any disease
model of addiction of which there are a great many,
but seems to have been taken over by supporters of the
BDMA as though they were the first to think of it.
Conversation with a member of the public, or journalist,
politician or nearly anyone who claims to believe that
addiction is a disease, reveals that this is all they mean
by it; further inquiry soon results in the kind of circular
reasoning noted above. Room may be right about the
deeper cultural function of the disease concept but, in
terms of practical consequences, all it seems to mean
for those members of the public who subscribe to it
is that addictive behaviour is caused by some, usu-
ally unspecified kind of disease and that, as a result,
addicts shouldn’t be blamed or punished for behaving as
they do.
Let us assume for the purposes of the remainder of
this article thatMarc Lewis is correct and that the BDMA
is fundamentally flawed in ascribing to addiction a dis-
ease status based on a neurological abnormality. Let us
also assume that, to make progress in alleviating the
harmful effects of addictive behaviour, it is necessary
to develop, test and refine some other account of addic-
tion – Lewis’ own developmental-learning model or
some other model that discards the foundational premise
of addiction as a disease. Would such an account inevi-
tably sow confusion in the public mind?Would rejection
of the disease concept lead inexorably, as supporters of
the BDMA perspective would very likely claim, to a
reversion to moralistic attitudes and punitive responses
to addiction? Thus the question to be addressed in this
article is whether it is true that there is no other way to
persuade the public that addicts should receive sympathy
and, when they ask for it, help to change their behaviour.
Related questions are whether the disease concept in
general and the BDMA in particular is successful in
reducing stigma and whether there is no other way of
doing so.
Addiction and Science in the Public Understanding
The idea that calling it a disease is the only under-
standing of addiction that avoids blaming and
punishing addicts is simply untrue. It is obviously
possible to present a behavioural, a psychosocial, a
biopsychosocial or, indeed, any other plausible model
of addiction without implying either that it is a disease
or that addicts should be blamed and punished. For
example, while Lewis [3] generously concedes that the
disease model Bhas countered the perception that ad-
dicts are morally deficient or self-indulgent, arguably
reducing the stress and isolation they and their families
experience^ (p. 7), there is absolutely nothing in his
own developmental-learning model that, despite its
rejection of the disease model, leads us to conclude
that we should return to seeing addicts as morally
deficient or self-indulgent. It should go without saying
that one can’t derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ and that
blame and punishment have no place in science. A
modern alternative to a moralistic view of addiction is
a scientific view but disease models of addiction,
including the BDMA, represent only one subset of
possible scientific accounts. So, in claiming that it is
only by seeing addiction as a brain disease that blame
and punishment can be avoided, Leshner, Volkow and
their colleagues, in the remarks quoted above, confuse
‘disease’ and ‘science’.
It might be claimed, nevertheless, that the attribution of
disease is the only way the general public can understand
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the proposition that addicts should not be held morally
accountable for their behaviour – the only way, in other
words, that addiction can be apprehended as being caused
rather than freely chosen. Such a view would be deeply
patronising. When the first modern disease concept of
alcoholism was formulated in the 1940s and 1950s (see
[7]), the only mature, scientific language readily available
for the public to approach an understanding of addiction
came from medical science (apart perhaps from psycho-
analysis, which has never had much to offer an under-
standing of addiction). Now, however, there is a much
wider appreciation of concepts derived from neurological,
behavioural and social science that can be used for this
purpose and can avoid the conflation of cause and disease.
With the continuing expansion of higher education and
growing participation at various levels of specialism on
courses on aspects of neurology, psychology and socio-
logy, the public is much more au fait with concepts and
principles that would allow them to follow non-disease
explanations of addiction. Some kind of test of this asser-
tion would be to follow up the response to articles and
interviews in popular newspapers andmagazines in which
Marc Lewis has tried to explain his theory of addiction to
the public [e.g., 16–18].2
Stigma
As Marc Lewis would agree, the disease concept has
been responsible over the years for diverting many users
of illicit drugs and addicts from prison to treatment and
this is no mean achievement. Awider claim, as we have
seen, is that, because addicts are not held responsible for
their behavior, the disease concept can remove the stigma
that would otherwise be attached to addiction in the
public mind. Is this true?
The first point to make is that the interplay between
addiction and stigma is more complicated than this
question suggests. First, general disapproval of the
effects of heavy drinking or other substance use is
an important informal social control that helps to
inhibit the progression to heavier use and more
serious harm [19]. Although society’s attitudes to drug
use and intoxication are fundamentally ambivalent [20],
these informal social controls must be counted a form of
stigma but one presumably with benign effects. Any
attempt to remove stigma from drug use and addiction,
not merely one based on the disease concept, must take
account of this inevitable barrier.
Secondly, the straightforward proposal that seeing a
behavior as the consequence of disease necessarily leads
to benign attitudes to it can be empirically examined and
is, in fact, found considerably wanting. Some 30 years
ago, John Crawford and I carried out a survey of the
general public in Scotland regarding their attitudes to the
disease concept of alcoholism and the treatment of
alcoholics [21]. Although concerned with only one kind
of addiction, the findings of this survey are directly
relevant to the issues under discussion here and have
not received the attention they deserve. We gave a
representative sample of 200 members of the general
public in Dundee a questionnaire on beliefs about alco-
holism and attitudes to alcoholics. We then subjected
responses on 5-point Likert scales to factor analysis.
The results of this survey showed first that the ma-
jority of the public (70 %) endorsed the disease concept
by agreeing that BAlcoholism is best seen as a form of
disease or illness^. This finding was comparable to
figures reported in the American attitudes literature up
to that time and suggests that, even 30 years ago and
before the BDMA had been promoted, the widespread
publicity campaign to have alcoholism recognized as a
disease had ostensibly met with success, at least in the
north-east of Scotland. However, and this is the crucial
point, the factor analysis showed that whether or not
respondents endorsed the disease concept of alcoholism
had little directly to do with whether or not they had a
sympathetic attitude to the treatment of alcoholics and
believed that public money should be devoted to treat-
ment, etc.; the latter was better predicted by more gen-
eral, non-condemnatory and humanitarian attitudes to
socially deviant groups as a whole, an attitude we
dubbed an Bhumanitarian worldview .^3 The twentieth
Century had seen a growth in humanitarian attitudes
toward most deviant groups in Western societies and it
2 Visit http://www.memoirsofanaddictedbrain.com/media-biology-
of-desire/ for a list of articles, reviews, interviews etc. regarding
Marc Lewis’ book, The Biology of Desire (Marc Lewis, 2017,
Addiction and the brain: development, not disease, Neuroethics), .
3 An earlier study by John Crawford looked at this issue from a
different perspective. In a comparison of attitudes toward alco-
holics and compulsive gamblers, he found that, although there was
a large difference in the extent to whichmembers of the public saw
these conditions as a disease or illness, they did not differ in the
extent to which they considered alcoholics or compulsive gam-
blers to be entitled to treatment. These findings illustrate the idea
that the disease label need not convey an advantage in the attempt
to engender positive attitudes to the treatment of addicts. See
Crawford and Heather [21].
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seems that it was this cultural trend, rather than endorse-
ment of the disease concept, that largely accounted for
positive historical change in attitudes to alcoholics.
Whether or not one believed that alcoholics deserved
treatment and that public funds should be devoted to it
was much better predicted by one’s political affiliation
and what newspaper one read than by whether or not
one publicly endorsed the disease concept of alcohol-
ism. It would be fascinating to try to replicate these
findings today and with different addictions.
Other surveys in the older literature also produced
findings inconsistent with the equation of disease beliefs
and sympathetic attitudes to alcohol addicts (see Heath-
er and Robertson [7, pp. 100–101]) and cast doubt on
Leshner’s [9] assumption that belief in the disease con-
cept and belief that addicts are morally weak are incom-
patible positions. Although several studies showed that
the disease concept had been successfully implanted in
the public mind, a corresponding decline in moral
attitudes had not occurred. For example, as early as
1964 Mulford and Miller [22] reported that 75 % of
their sample defined alcoholics as Bmorally weak^ or
Bweak-willed^ while 41 % defined them as both
morally weak and ill. In other studies, endorsement
of moral weakness statements was more common in
respondents who endorsed a disease conception than
in those who rejected it [7, 21]. All this evidence
suggests that acceptance of the disease concept of
addiction by the general public is largely lip-service.
Stigma and the BDMA
More recently, Bell and colleagues [23] found very
mixed support for the BDMA among clinicians involved
in the treatment of addictions in Australia, echoing earlier
findings of ambiguous and ambivalent attitudes to the
disease concept of alcoholism among clinicians in the
UK [see 7, p. 101). Although more research of this kind
would be valuable, the conclusion must be that the claim
that the BDMA removes stigma among professional
workers, and is therefore of benefit in the treatment of
addiction, is not currently supported by evidence.
Rachel Hammer and colleagues [24, 25] conducted
in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 63 patients in
treatment for addiction in alcohol and/or nicotine treat-
ment centres in the USMidwest, as well as 20 addiction
scientists of various kinds. Interviewees were asked
about their understanding of addiction, including whether
they considered it to be a disease. The authors’ conclusion
from these data was that, despite popular arguments that
framing addiction as a disease will improve treatments
outcomes and decrease moral stigma, such a framing is
not only unnecessary but may actually be harmful. They
also pithily observe: BRather than a malady of the weak-
willed, addiction reframed as a pathology of the weak-
brained (or weak-gened) bears just as much potential for
wielding stigma and creating marginalized populations^
[25, p.28].
Stigma and Biogenetic Explanations of Behavioural
Disorders in General
The issue of the societal effects of the BDMA and of
disease concept of addiction more generally cannot be
separated from the wider effects of biogenetic explana-
tions of mental illness and behavioural disorders on the
public’s attitudes and responses. After all, addiction
attracts a psychiatric diagnosis and is specified in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM), albeit in the fifth and latest manifestation [26] as
‘substance use disorder’.
Kvaale and colleagues [27] carried out the first meta-
analytic review of studies looking at the effects on
stigma of biogenetic explanations of mental disorders,
including substance use disorders. Samples included in
the review consisted of lay people, professionals, and
individuals themselves affected by psychological prob-
lems. Themain finding was that biogenetic explanations
did appear to reduce blame but also induced pessimism
over the future prospects of those suffering from these
disorders. It was also found that biogenetic explanations
increased endorsement of the stereotype that people
with psychological problems are dangerous, an under-
standable reaction to the idea that addiction, for exam-
ple, is the result of permanent changes to brain mecha-
nisms over which the sufferer has no control.
The idea that, rather than encouraging sympathetic
attitudes, brain disease explanations may have the op-
posite effect is supported by findings from a study by
Mehta and Farina [28]. In a contrived experiment, they
asked volunteers to administer either mild or strong
electric shocks to two groups of ‘patients’ if they failed
a certain test. Patients believed to have a brain disorder
were shocked at a higher level and faster rate than those
whose disorder was believed to be psychosocial in
origin. As the authors say, their results Bprovide little
support for the claim that regarding the mentally disor-
dered as sick or diseased will promote greater acceptance
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or more favourable treatment^ (p. 405). A similar exper-
iment specifically on addiction would be useful.
We know from other research that those among us
who are seen as suffering from behavioural abnormali-
ties of biological origin are viewed by the average
person as dangerous and unpredictable, resulting in
efforts to avoid interacting with them, with the inevita-
ble consequence that the sufferer’s sense of isolation and
alienation is exacerbated. As James Davies [29] has put
it: BParadoxically, … the worldwide psychiatric cam-
paigns whose goals are to reduce stigma associated with
mental illness by asserting that it’s just like any other
biological disease may well have helped bring about the
very opposite of what (was) intended^ (p. 223).
Nor can it be claimed with any justification that
biogenetic explanations increase empathy among clini-
cians treating behavioural disorders. Lebowitz and Ahn
[30] reported a series of studies in which clinicians in the
USA read descriptions of potential patients whose symp-
toms were explained in either biological or psychosocial
terms. Rather than increasing clinicians’ empathy (on the
ground that patients were less blameworthy for their
actions), biological explanations of behaviour evoked
significantly less empathy. These results, say the authors,
Bare consistent with other research and theory that
has suggested that biological accounts of psycho-
pathology can exacerbate perceptions of patients as
abnormal, distinct from the rest of the population,
meriting social exclusion, and even less than fully
human^ (p. 17786).
Interestingly, a group of psychiatrists has recently
written about what they perceive to be a crisis in their
science and profession [31]. Although not disparaging
the brain sciences and psychopharmacology, they argue
that psychiatry needs to move beyond the dominance of
what they call the current, technological paradigm, a
move that would be more in keeping with evidence
about how good outcomes are achieved and might also
foster more meaningful collaboration with the growing
service user movement. They go on:
B… the promise of therapeutic gains from the
brain sciences always seems to be for the future,
leading some to interrogate their contribution to
advances in our field… Indeed, neuroscientists
themselves have become more cautious about
the value of reductionist approaches to under-
standing the nature of human thought, emotion and
behaviour… Furthermore, there is ample evidence
that anti-stigma campaigns based on biogenetic
models of serious mental illness have been coun-
terproductive^ (p. 430).
From the evidence briefly reviewed above, there
must be a presumption that this counterproductivity of
biogenetic models embraces the addictions field. Indeed,
the onus now lies with proponents of the BDMA to
demonstrate that this is not the case.
So, if Addiction Is Neither a Brain Disease Nor
a Moral Failing, What Is it?
The main purpose of this article has been to show that
the BDMA does not necessarily lead to more benign
attitudes to addiction among the general public and
professional workers. However, the question in the
heading above demands an answer before we proceed
further, even if that answer is self-evident. As already
noted, the model of addiction described by Marc Lewis
in his article in this Special Issue is clearly a scientific
explanation of addiction that eschews disease and yet
does not suggest blaming or punishing addicts.
There are, unsurprisingly, other possibilities. One
is to see addiction primarily as a disorder of choice
[1, 32, 33]. There will not be space here to discuss
these theoretical issues with any thoroughness but a
few observations may be made. Such a view of
addiction might not be incompatible with Lewis’
developmental-learning model but would place more
emphasis than Lewis gives on reinterpreting the role
of choice in addiction (see Lewis [3, p. 8]); while
Lewis’ model is concerned primarily with how
addiction develops, a disorder-of-choice model is
concerned to describe and explain the essential
nature of addiction as a failure of self-regulation.
Addiction is seen as a disorder of choice in the
sense that it represents a kind of failure to make
consistent choices over time [34]. Thus, although
addicts respond to incentives and are free to choose
to use or not to use at any one time, autonomy is
impaired when their pattern of choices is considered
over time (i.e., their ‘extended agency’ [34]). A person
makes a strong resolution at time t1 to desist from a
specified behaviour at time t2 but, when t2 occurs, fails
to carry out that resolution. When that happens repeat-
edly and distressingly, we can describe this pattern of
behavior as addiction [35]. Though addictive behaviour
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is voluntary at the time it is carried out, addiction in-
volves an interaction of voluntary and involuntary pro-
cesses conceptualised in a dual-systems account of hu-
man behaviour [1]. Without going further (but see [1,
34]) we may note that this understanding of addiction
makes central use of the ancient philosophical concept
of akrasia or ‘weakness of will’ [35], as well as concepts
such as temptation, self-control and willpower. So too,
addictive behaviour is assumed to be voluntary, not
compulsive, at the time it is carried out [36].
It should go without saying that the employment of
such terms in a scientific theory of addiction has no
logical consequences for whether or not addicts should
be blamed and punished; it is possible to say that addicts
are ‘responsible’ for their behaviour, in the sense that
addictive behaviour is voluntary at the time it is enacted,
without at the same time blaming them for it [37].
Nevertheless, such language is anathema to devotees
of the BDMA and they would undoubtedly claim that
a reversion to punitive attitudes among the public would
follow if such a theory became widely known.
It must indeed be conceded that a theory of addiction
couched in terms of weakness of will, self-control and
willpower would present special difficulties for commu-
nication. Misunderstandings would be fuelled by
oversimplified, distorted and sensationalist portrayals
in the media, including those prompted or taken advan-
tage of by scientists and clinicians with vested interests
in the BDMA. There is also the danger that models
allowing some role for choice in addiction would play
into the hands of those who profit from the sale of
products with addiction potential, especially those in
the smoking, alcohol and gambling industries who ap-
peal to the consumer’s Bfreedom to choose^ and their
Bpersonal responsibility^ for controlling their consump-
tion. Such discourses would also be endorsed by govern-
ments of a neoliberal complexion. Thus it would be naïve
not to recognize these societal and political risks of
proposing that addiction is a disorder of choice.
How Could Addiction as a Disorder of Choice
Be Presented to the Public?
It may be true that weakness of will or, in other lan-
guage, ‘above average difficulty in behavioural self-
regulation’ is a characterological or personality trait that
is evident across a wide range of situations and persists
over long periods of time. If so, however, that would be
less relevant to a model of addiction as a disorder of
choice than another aspect of weakness of will – that we
are all weak-willed. That is to say, addicts struggle with
extreme variants of a difficulty in controlling behavior
that affects all members of the human race past infancy
on a daily basis and has been recognised at least since
the story of Adam and Eve as a fundamental aspect of
the human predicament. If empirical evidence for this
assertion is needed, Hoffman and colleagues [38] stud-
ied a large sample of adult citizens of Germany and
found that people reported fighting against a desire for
approximately one-quarter of their waking hours, giving
in on roughly half of occasions. So too, when people in
the USA were asked about reasons for failing to meet
their goals for healthy living, ‘lack of willpower’ was
named as the most important factor [39].
All this suggests that, if addiction were presented to
the public as an extreme version of a problem with
which we are all familiar— and buttressed perhaps by
slogans along the lines of, BThere but for the grace of
God go I^ - understanding and compassion might be
increased and stigma avoided or, at least, reduced. There
has been a recent flurry of self- help books on willpower
aimed at the popular market [40–43] and, assuming that
these books achieve some commercial success, this
suggests that the public might be receptive to such
messages. This kind of education would have the oppo-
site effect to telling people that addicts have a mysteri-
ous brain disease. Communications about addiction as a
disorder of choice would emphasise the continuity of the
experience of ‘addicts’ with that of people not so la-
belled and the intelligibility of addictive behaviour and
experience to ordinary people. This would contrast
sharply with communications about addiction as a dis-
ease based on some ‘pathological’ process applying
only to addicts that the layperson finds unfamiliar and
unintelligible but is expected to take on trust.
A remaining objection from supporters of the BDMA
can be anticipated. This is that, even if the weakness of
will component of a disorder-of-choice model of addic-
tion were understood by the public, there would remain
the problem that addictive behaviour was described in
this model as involving voluntary behaviour – or what
Volkow and Li [44] would prefer to call Bthe perni-
cious yet enduring popular belief that their (addicted
individuals’) affliction stems from voluntary behaviour^
(p.1430, parentheses added). As such, they would claim,
there would be nothing to prevent addicts from facing
continued stigmatisation. It is, of course, meaningless to
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say that addiction ‘stems’ from voluntary behaviour but
what is true is that the disorder-of-choice model posits
that addiction involves an interaction of voluntary and
involuntary processes. This is not the place to enter into
the complexities of the debate as to whether, and if so in
what way, addictive behaviour can justifiably be de-
scribed as compulsive (but see [45]). However, arguably
one reason the disease view may not be accepted by
some members of the public (and some academics) is
that drug-seeking and drug-taking, by an addict or by
anyone else, is self-evidently voluntary behaviour and,
further, that to deny this palpable fact is an outstanding
example of the emperor’s new clothes [46]. If so, what is
needed is a model that continues to see addiction as
behaviour that people find extremely difficult to change
while at the same time accepting the obvious fact of
voluntary drug-seeking and –taking. A model of this
kind would be to see addiction as a disorder of choice.
Addiction and Access to Treatment
Marc Lewis [3] makes a good case for the scientific
inadequacy of the BDMA and others too have dem-
onstrated its limitations [e.g. 47–49]. However, one
response to these criticisms is to concede the deficien-
cies of the BDMA, or some of them, but to maintain
that the disease concept is still necessary in public-
facing communications to ensure that addicts get ac-
cess to treatment, insurance coverage, time off from
work and so forth, as well as persuading governments
to fund research and rehabilitation facilities, etc. [50,
p.461]. The brain disease version of the disease con-
cept would simply be the most current and authorita-
tive of possible disease concepts available for this
purpose. While the underlying ‘pathology’ of the dis-
ease of addiction is yet to be demonstrated, so this
argument would run, there is no consensus on the
definition of disease and so, because ‘treatment’ is
obviously a medical term, calling addiction a disease
is necessary to get addicts a better deal from society
than they would otherwise receive. Many years ago
Robin Room [51, p. 1056] called this argument
Bhumane cynicism^.
Is it true that advancing an understanding of addic-
tion as a disorder of choice or a developmental-learning
disorder, assuming they were widely accepted, would
decrease access to treatment and all the other alleged
societal benefits of the BDMA? Again, it is easy to see
how misunderstandings might arise. A solution to this
particular problem, however, would be to emphasise
that addictive behaviours are typically health-damaging
behaviours and therefore need to be ‘treated’ in medical
settings in order to prevent or limit the progress of
diseases that are undoubtedly of legitimate medical con-
cern.4 This already happens to some extent in the
deployment of brief interventions in medical settings
against smoking, excessive alcohol consumption, over-
eating and other health-damaging behaviours [52]. All
that is needed is to regard addiction as continuous
throughout the population of regular users of psychoac-
tive substances and to extend the principle of interven-
tion to the treatment of addictive behaviours in general.
Indeed, one might go further and argue that the concept
of addiction would become theoretically redundant if
addictive behaviours were subsumed under the larger
set of hard-to-reduce/eliminate health-damaging behav-
iours [14, 53]. Be that as it may, there should be little
difficulty in obtaining access to treatment, insurance
coverage and research funding for secondary and tertiary
prevention of diseases caused by addictive behaviours.
The Future of Addiction
Marc Lewis ends his essay in this Special Issue [3] with
some inspiring passages concerning the need for Ba third
stage^ in our collective understanding of addiction. The
first stage, beginning in pre-industrial times and still
influential in some quarters today, was the moral under-
standing in which what we would now call addicts were
held to be morally responsible for their behaviour and
the appropriate response was Bto punish the addict
through scorn, isolation, disenfranchisement, or
incarceration^ (p. 15). The second stage, beginning in
the early nineteenth Century and culminating in today’s
BDMA, is the disease understanding in which Bthe
appropriate solution to addiction is to be found in the
realm of medicine (and in which)… addicts should be
urged (convinced or compelled) to follow the advice
handed down by medical practitioners^ (p. 16). Lewis
calls for a third stage based on the developmental-
4 This is not to say that the damaging consequences of addictive
behaviours are restricted to health; they are obviously far wider
than that. The point here, however, is that, within a medical
context, emphasising the health-damaging consequences of addic-
tive behaviours legitimises their place within health services with-
out the need to define the behaviours themselves as diseases.
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learning model outlined in his essay in which recovery
is seen in terms of individual development and
growth beyond addiction.
Lewis and I differ on the details of what this third
stage in the understanding of addiction should look like
but I agree with him wholeheartedly on the need for it
and on the need, in particular, to shake off the stultifying
dominance of the BDMA in addiction science and prac-
tice. What worries me most about the BDMA is that,
despite the pious concessions of its proponents about the
need to take into account social ‘factors’, by far its major
practical consequence is the attempt, in the unholy col-
laboration between medicine and the pharmaceutical
industry, to invent yet more psychoactive substances
and other medical procedures to correct the purported
deficiencies in brain functioning held to be responsible
for the disease of addiction [54]. Rather than resulting in
any miracle cure, this is only likely to replicate the
catastrophic failure of drug therapy for mental illness
that has occurred over the last 70 years [55] and perpet-
uate the over-medicalisation of problems in living that
others have warned us about [56]. No sensible person
would dispute the potential contribution of neuroscience
to our understanding of addiction but, to my mind, the
BDMA is not only inhumane, it is also deeply unintel-
ligent in its ‘eliminative reductionism’ [57] and its
resulting inability to begin to grasp what addiction is
about. We need a new ‘governing image’ [58] in public
discourse about addiction and we need thinkers like
Marc Lewis to help show us the way.
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